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virtue of 
Tl~efollowing essay is bascd on Today 1 address a single problem 
testimony prrscntcd before the associated with Chapter 11 and propose 
Ban h~-uptcy Commission in May 1 997 alternative changes in Chapter 1 1 that 
in Washington, D.C. might alleviate the problem. There are 
many ways to criticize the substance of 
Chapter 11 and the procedure embedded 
in it. Others will argue today that several 
of the proposed changes before this 
Commission are unwse. I leave those 
specific issues to them; I direct my 
attention to a change that would alleviate 
many of the other substantive problems 
with Chapter 11. 
In my opinion the principal difficulty 
with Chapter 11 is not that it unfairly 
favors one group or that the priorities 
which it establishes are misguided. In my 
opinion the principal difficulty with 
Chapter 1 1 is that i t  gives strong 
incentives to various Chapter 11 players 
to distort the priorities that were 
intended by Congress. 
It is wrong to think of Chapter 11's as 
principally judicial proceedings. A drawn 
out Chapter 11 proceeding is best 
regarded as a beehive of non-judicial 
activity in which each bee is attempting 
to seize some part of the available wealth 
for itself in ways that are often contrary 
to the priorities set down by Congress in 
the Bankniptcy Code. Managers (who 
may have run the business into the 
ground) profit from keeping the business 
on life support in Chapter 11 by being 
paid salary out of assets that would 
otherwise go to prepetition creditors. 
Shareholders and unsecured creditors 
whose claims appear to be under water 
preserve the possibility, however slim, of 
some return in a future reorganization by 
keeping a Chapter 11 alive. Professionals 
hired by the estate - lawyers, 
accountants, investment bankers and 
others - charge by the hour and so may 
have the strongest incenti17es to keep the 
Chapter 11 going. 
By comparison with an efficient and 
expeditious process, the current Chapter 
11 is both costly and unfaithful to 
Congress' mandate. The additional 
amounts paid to lawyers, accountants 
and others to get a result that could have 
been achieved in shorter time and with 
lower fees are dead-weight losses. 
Lingering in bankruptcy doubtless 
engenders much larger indirect costs, 
costs that are hard to measure but still 
palpable. These are the costs of business 
decisions not made and of other sub- 
optimal business choices that always 
occur when a business is under court 
supervision and subject to the control of 
waning factions. 
Apart from [he costs of a continuing 
Chapter 1 1, there is also a reallocation of 
resources among the players in what is 
often a zero-sum game. If, for example, a 
business liquidates after lingering in 
Chapter 11, money that otherwise would 
and should go to existing creditors will 
be diverted into the hands of the 
managers. If a plausible threat of even 
greater delay can be made by the 
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be examples - may call for a longer 
period, but those are the exceptions. 
Of course, the absence of public 
support for delay does not foreclose 
cynical and private support for delay 
Every person who profits from the 
continuation of a Chapter 11 has some 
incentive to keep it going, even where 
the continuation perverts the htribution 
scheme. Privately, therefore, managers, 
shareholders, unsecured creditors, and 
professionals who are paid according to 
time spent have a selfish interest in delay 
at least to the extent there are assets 
available that will be taken from others 
and given to them. 
Because the current law gives a 
substantial incentive to the managers and 
their agents to prolong the bankruptcy, - the Commission should be skeptical 
about their indorsement of the status 
quo. As I have suggested in print, to ask 
Harvey Miller to attack Chapter 11 is like 
asking Itzhak Perlman to bum his violin. 
The most successful and renowned 
bankruptcy lawyers' virtuoso status 
depends upon manipulation of a 
complex Chapter 11 ; they cannot be 
objective analysts of its vices and virtues. 
A similar claim might also be made 
, . 
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to distort the prioriti 
concerning bankruptcy judges' 
objectivity who, but for the intricate legal 
issues in Chapter 11, would be 
condemned to live on an intellectual 
dunghill. I recognize, therefore, that 
there may be substantial silent - even 
unconscious - support for maintaining 
an elaborate and lengthy proceeding 
among the professionals associated with 
the process. I believe that this support 
I should be challenged as potentially self- 
interested and motivated by incentives 
that the players will not acknowledge in 
public and may not admit to themselves. 
Assume with me that Congress did 
not intend that Chapter 11 proceedings 
drag on in the hope that the economy or 
some newfound insight might save the 
firm. Assume that Congress intended 
that Chapter 11's proceed as rapidly as 
possible. Assume, too, that it is almost 
always in the interest of some of the 
parties (perhaps the unsecured creditors, 
perhaps the priority creditors, perhaps 
the shareholders, and assuredly the 
professionals), that the Chapter 11 
proceeding be drawn out. How then can 
Chapter 11 practice be made to conform 
to Chapter 11 theory? 
The most obvious but not necessarily 
the most efficacious attack upon delay is 
to modify the time limits in Section 
1121. That is what the Congress did in 
1994 when it established shorter dates 
for small business bankruptcies. The 
periods in Section 1121 can be and often 
are extended by judges who are 
sympathetic to pleas for more time. A 
simple change in the exclusivity period 
may be effective if the judge listens 
carefully and takes a firm hand, but if the 
judge is sympathetic to the pleas of the 
debtor or is busy with other things, 
shortening the times in Section 112 1 
may have little impact, for they do not 
change the incentives of the parties. 
Successful modification of the system 
will require altera~ion of the incentives of 
the managers, shareholders, creditors, 
and their agents. Consider three 
possibilities, among many, that might 
alter those incentives. 
First is the possibility of replacing the 
debtor in possession with a trusCee. Mr. 
Sigal has made this suggestion, as have 
others, such as Professor Adams. This, 
too, is the French process and, of course, 
prior to the adoption of the Banlzruptcy 
Reform Act in 1978 that was the 
invariable procedure in Chapter X. 
Contrary to the assumption of the 
Bankruptcy Commission of the 19705, 
the argument for ousting management 
does not depend on the proposition that 
the trustee will better operate the 
business than the existing management 
- though that might be the case. The 
trustee is a ghost, a threat; he could 
haunt the dreams of the managers. The 
statutory authorization of a trustee is the 
ever present reminder to management 
they may lose their position if they file 
Chapter 11, and having filed Chapter 11, 
that they may at any time be replaced 
and so lose their continuing salaries and 
other perquisites. In its conclusion that a 
trustee could not operate the business as 
effectively as existing management, the 
Congress overlooked the fact that the 
threat of management's removal might 
have a stronger effect upon the Chapter 
11 than their actual removal and 
replacement. How many firms would 
have steered clear of bankruptcy entirely 
or alternatively would have passed 
directly to Chapter 7 where they belong, 
had management been assured that it 
would be ousted upon the filing? How 
many would have come to a speedy 
conclusion with new incentives? 
The possibility of a trustee also has 
implications for the professionals who 
advise the debtor in possession. 
Presumably a trustee will bring his own 
lawyer, his own accountant, and other 
professionals. At minimum the new 
trustee will not be beholden to the 
existing professionals. 
The threat of a trustee should have 
salutary effects on the managers of a firm 
contemplating or in bankruptcy and 
because the managers have greater 
control of the firm than any others, the 
threat of a trustee may have the largest 
and most salutary effect on the incentives 
of the players in Chapter 11. There are 
many ways to draft a provision for a 
trustee. In my view, the stronger the 
threat, the better the incentive. The 
barriers to the appointmenr: of a trustee 
should not be high. 
A second possibility for modifying  he 
incentives of the various parties would be 
to amend section 507 (b). Thai provision 
now reads in part as follows: 
"If the trustee . . . provided adequate 
protection of the interest of a holder of a 
claim secured by a lien on property of 
the debtor ,and if, notwithstanding such 
protection, such creditor has a claim 
allowable under subsection (a) (1) ol this 
section arising from the stay of action 
against such property . . . then such 
creditor's claim under such subsection 
shall have priority over every other claim 
allowable under such subsection." 
In effect, the provision assures that 
certain secured creditors (who have been 
provided "adequate" protection that 
proves not to be adequate) will be treated 
as first priority claimants and will so 
prime not only prepetition unsecured 
creditors, but many postpetition creditors 
as well. Section 507 (b) could be 
modified to read as follows: 
"A secured creditor shall have a claim 
under section 507 (a) (1) with priority 
over every other claim allowable under 
that subsection. That claim shall equal 
the difference between (i) the value of . 
the secured creditor's collateral that 
would have been available to it at the 
filing of the petition and (ii) the value of 
the collateral made available to it during 
or upon the conclusion of the 
bankruptcy proceeding, less the value of 
any amounts transferred to that creditor 
as adequate protection." 
This proposal would allow a secured 
creditor to have a priority claim to the 
extent of the decrease in value of its 
collateral or for the loss arising from 
disposition of that collateral during the 
pendency of the bankruptcy Because the 
money would ultimately come out of the 
pockets of pre- and postpetition 
unsecured creditors - including the 
pockets of other administrative expense 
claimants - all of those persons would 
find their own interests aligned with the 
interests of secured creditors. 
I am aware that a provision ol the 
kind I suggest will make some 
professionals squeal like pigs stuck under 
a wire fence. They will argue that no 
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debtor will be able to hire a lawyer or 
accountant unless that person can be 
assured of receiving payment ahead of 
secured creditors to the extent there are 
free assets. I am skeptical of the accuracy 
of those assertions and, in anj7 case, 
unmo\~ed. In my view, the solution for 
the prospective administrati\?e claimant is 
to insure a speedy resolution of the 
Chapter 11 or a quick con~~ersion to 
Chapter 7 so that the available collateral 
is not dissipated. 
A third possibility is to amend Section 
361 to reverse that part of Timbers qf 
Inwood Forat,  Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988), 
that denies lost opportunity costs. Some. 
I among them, would argue that the 
courts in general and the Supreme Court 
in particular have not been true to the 
promises made to the secured creditors 
in Section 361 and in the 1978 Senate 
Report under 36 1. That section promises 
the "indubitable equivalent'. (and the 
Report buttresses that promise), but after 
Timbors the section does not deliver 
indubitable equi\ralence. Secured 
creditors in the L n '  bankruptcy that 
commenced in July 1986 and concluded 
in May 1993 were deprived of interest 
for the entire period, an amount that 
might have doubled their money If 
secured creditors were assured of a 
proper return on the value of their 
collateral (after the time when they 
would ha1.e been able to liquidate that 
collateral but for the bankruptcy), nTe 
might find the unsecured creditors, 
shareholders - and possibly even the 
professionals - aligned ni th  secured 
creditors in wishing for a hast!. resolution 
of a Chapter 11. 
I am certain there are other more 
clever ways in which the parts of 
Chapter 11 - particularly the 
administrative po~vers and the priority 
provisions in Chapters 3 and 5 - can be 
manipulated to modify the incentives of 
the players in the Chapter 11 game. I 
invite you to think of those and to 
consider them, too. 
I leave you uith two points. First, the 
Commission should devote careful 
thought to the question of how Chapter 
11's can be speeded either to a successful 
plan or to a quick conversion to Chapter 
7. Speed is an antidote to many ol the 
reduce costs and will foreclose 
distortions of the bankruptcy pr ior i~>~ 
scheme in long-running Chapter 1 1 s 
where managers, shareholders and 
postpetition creditors take pqments  that 
should go to others. 
Second, the speed of Chapter 11s nil1 
quicken only if  the proper incentives are 
given to the players In Chapter 11 
proceedings - to the bees in the 
beehive. It is not enough to modify the 
times in Section 1 1 2 1 or othenqise to 
depend upon a busy judge to insure that 
things occur on time. Far better to give 
the proper incenti~~es to the managers, 
professionals, secured and unsecured 
creditors. I indorse the possibility of 
shortening the period in Section 112 1, 
but I think it better to alter Section 507 
(b), rel7erse T ~ T ~ I ~ c I - s ,  and to set up a 
trustee as threat to existing management. 
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substantive ills in Chapter 11. That speed 
nil1 benefit not only secured creditors, 
but unsecured creditors as well. I t  uill 
